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“The Contemporary Relevance of the Iliad” 
Erwin Cook 
 
Originally presented as a lecture for the Food For Thought Lecture Series, 
Trinity University, May 1, 2013. 
 
Introduction: The Plot of the Iliad and the Problem of Interpretation 
 I initially balked at the request to talk about the contemporary relevance of 
Homeric poetry. I did so because I am of the camp that maintains great art does not need 
to be defended on these terms, which is to say its skill, beauty and profundity give it all 
the relevance it needs to be of lasting relevance. But I do recognize that my justification, 
which also keeps me from studying ancient graffiti and medieval doorknockers, assumes 
that at some level of remove there are enduring qualities to these works that do indeed, 
and will always, give them contemporary relevance. Instead of trying to sell the Iliad in 
these terms, however, I found I could do something more in the spirit of the original 
request and show how it allows us to see certain aspects of the contemporary world with 
almost shocking clarity. In particular, I will deal with the Iliad’s unvarnished portrayal of 
the human will to power, the sociology of inner-city street gangs, and the psychological 
damage that warriors sometimes suffer on the battlefield. 
 As the Iliad begins, Akhilleus has recently sacked Lurnessos, Pedasos and many 
neighboring cities. In the division of the spoils that follows, Agamemnon is awarded 
Khruseis, and Akhilleus Briseis. The father of Khruseis soon turns up in camp and 
attempts to ransom his daughter. He bases his appeal on his offer of gifts and on his status 
as a priest of Apollo. Agamemnon brusquely dismisses the priest, who retires to the 
beach and prays to Apollo for revenge. Apollo hears his prayers and causes a plague that 
kills many Greeks. On the tenth day, Akhilleus calls an assembly and asks if prophet, 
priest, or dream interpreter could explain why Apollo is angry. At that Kalkhas stands up 
and declares the god is angry because Agamemnon dishonored his priest. So far, 
everything proceeds according to a clear and orderly causality, and is in fact a model of 
coherent, linear narrative. But what follows is puzzling in more than one way, and is sure 
to be misinterpreted if we try to do so in terms of our own cultural assumptions. 
 Agamemnon gives Kalkhas an angry look and says to him “Prophet of evil! never 
once have you said anything good to me . . . . All the same I am willing to give her back, 
if that’s better, I would rather the army be safe than to perish. But you must straightway 
make ready a prize for me, so that I am not alone among the Argives without a prize, 
since that would be unseemly.” Akhilleus replies by asking how the Akhaians can give 
him a prize since they have already been distributed. He nevertheless orders Agamemnon 
to give the girl up, with the promise that the Akhaians will repay him with interest if they 
sack Troy. Agamemnon replies “Don’t try to cheat me! You won’t get past me, nor 
persuade. Or is it because you want to have a prize yourself, but me to sit around thus, 
lacking one, that you tell me to give her back? . . . . If the Akhaians do not give me a 
prize I myself will take, either your prize, of the prize of Aias, or Odysseus.” 
 Akhilleus then asks Agamemnon how anyone will follow him in the future, for 
the Akhaians only came to Troy to secure honor for him and Menelaos. “But now,” he 
declares “you are threatening to take my prize, over which I have labored greatly, and the 
sons of the Akhaians gave me. Never do I get a prize equal to yours, whenever the 
Akhaians sack a prosperous city, though my hands manage the bulk of the furious 
fighting. . . . So now I will go back home to Phthie, I have no intention of gathering 
goods and wealth here for you.” Agamemnon bids Akhilleus to flee if he wants, for there 
are others who will honor him, above all Zeus. “But,” he adds, “I threaten you thus. Since 
Phoibos Apollo is taking Khruseis from me, . . . I am going to come to your hut and lead 
off your prize, Briseis, so that you know how much more powerful I am than you, and 
another man will shudder to declare himself my equal.” Akhilleus deliberates killing 
Agamemnon on the spot, but Athene descends from heaven and instructs him to 
withdraw himself and his men from the fighting, “for you shall receive three times so 
many shining gifts on account of this hubris.” Akhilleus obeys. 
 In the twenty five years I’ve taught the poem, I always dread this discussion, 
which always includes variations on the following: “Agamemnon is being petty!” “He’s 
paranoid!” “He’s an idiot!” “Akhilleus is acting like a spoiled brat!” “They’re both acting 
like spoiled brats!” If I’m really lucky, someone will ask, Why did Agamemnon accuse 
Kalkhas of never saying anything to his benefit? Or, How did Akhilleus realize so 
quickly Agamemnon intended to take Briseis? Or even, Why do they keep calling their 
women prizes? 
 Part of this we can dispose of rather quickly. To begin with Agamemnon’s 
supposed paranoia: the poet tells us in his own voice that Apollo caused Agamemnon and 
Akhilleus to fight because Agamemnon dishonored his priest; he also says that Hera put 
it in Akhilleus’ heart to call the assembly because she pitied the men dying. We know 
that Agamemnon is at fault and that Akhilleus is well-intentioned. But this is plainly not 
how Agamemnon sees it and he is far from being paranoid: it is a fact of history that until 
World War II more soldiers died of disease than in actual combat. Dysentery in particular 
was a constant threat: seen in this light, Agamemnon sealed his fate the moment he did 
not return Khruseis, since plague in the camp was inevitable and would be naturally 
attributed to Agamemnon’s offense against Apollo, who is the god of plagues. Of course, 
it still remained for someone to make that link, which may or not be “real,” whatever that 
even means, and hardly even matters when the army is dying. Agamemnon clearly thinks 
that Kalkhas, who has a nasty habit of making him lose young girls, has invented the link, 
and he suspects he knows who put him up to it. When Akhilleus asks for a prophet to 
explain the god’s anger, Kalkhas stands up and declares that he knows, but demands that 
Akhilleus protect him, “for,” he says, “I believe I will anger a man who powerfully rules 
over all the Argives, and the Argives obey him.” Akhilleus replies at once, “take courage, 
and speak the prophecy you know. For by Apollo, dear to Zeus, to whom you, Kalkhas, 
pray as you reveal prophecies to the Danaans, no one . . . will lay heavy hands on you, 
not while I live . . . not even if you should name Agamemnon, who now boasts that he is 
much the best of the Akhaians.” “Why, it is Agamemnon!” Kalkhas exclaims, “he 
dishonored the priest of Apollo.” Agamemnon is not the least bit paranoid: it seems 
obvious to him that Akhilleus has suborned the priest in order to make Agamemnon lose 
face. 
 We are still left with the issue of psychology, which is only sharpened when we 
recall that Khruseis and Briseis are slaves and that Akhilleus later declares he wishes 
Briseis had died rather than cause the quarrel that resulted in the death of Patroklos, 
someone he plainly cares about a whole lot more than her. Why, then, does he nearly kill 
Agamemnon over her in this scene, and how, to repeat the question of my dream student, 
does he so quickly realize that Agamemnon intends to take Briseis? Finally, why is 
Akhilleus’ love for Patroklos, which is clearly non-sexual in Homer, so intense that later 
critics have found it difficult to explain except in sexual terms. A full explanation 
involves us directly in the continued relevance of Homeric poetry. To make my point, I 
will take two radically different approaches to the scene, one by comparing Homeric 
society to inner city gang behavior, and another comparing Homeric warriors to Vietnam 
vets suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. 
 
Part I: The Sociology of Homeric Society and The Code of the Streets 
My discussion of the sociology of inner city gangs is based on Elijah Anderson’s The 
Code of the Streets.1 Inner city gangs form a society within society, with clearly defined 
members and rules. This inner society arises from a variety of causes, which include: a 
lack of law enforcement; little or no support from society at large; a lack of institutional 
superstructures to protect individuals; internalized contempt and rejection of society at 
large; general poverty, helplessness and hopelessness. In short, it assumes a 
Weltanshauung of personal abandonment in a hostile world, and a general sense that 
there is little respect to be had: consequently, everyone competes to get what he can of 
what little respect is available (89). A further effect is that as soon as one person decides 
to gain respect by being feared, structures emerge, leading to formation gang 
communities and the code of the streets. 
 Features of the code include, above all, an obsession with respect and reputation, 
or in Homeric terms timē and kleos.2 Respect serves as an intangible coat of armor: it is a 
form of intimidation designed to produce fear. The psychology of respect is not, however, 
simply based on self-preservation, but equally on the need to be compensated for a sense 
of insignificance, powerlessness, and a lack of alternatives in the wider world. It is thus 
an oppositional model, in which a group structured by respect turns its back on the rest of 
the world: within this world, life regains its meaning. 
 And in this world, of seeking and preserving respect, negotiations go on at a 
symbolic level, that involve clothing, grooming, gait, demeanor, facial expressions and 
looking. It is thus a form of prestation, in which physical objects assert the respect one is 
owed: put concretely, “I wear this jacket because I can”. “Dissing” is another symbolic 
activity, that can be quickly translated to physical action. The insult does not need to be 
true: all that matters is whether the speaker can make it ‘stick’. 
 The code may center on one being granted deference: however, “as people 
increasingly feel buffeted by forces beyond their control, what one deserves in the way of 
respect becomes more and more problematic and uncertain” (82). As a result, the code 
provides a framework and mechanisms for negotiating respect: whereas violence is a 
given, the code simply seeks to regulate it. A person’s clothing and so on are thus 
designed to prevent aggression: appearance is reality. That is, the goal is to ‘perform’ an 
identity that prevents others from challenging your respect. The code is thus based on 
physicality and intimidation, and it is ruthless. 
 A person who does not command respect may be in immediate physical danger. 
Respect must therefore be negotiated in real time: it is hard to obtain, is defined by the 
group, has a quasi-material basis, is quickly lost, and is under constant negotiation. 
People who live by the code have thin skins and are trigger happy: that is, they are 
supersensitive to slights in part because slights, however slight, are possible precursors to 
actual violence (note again the ‘real time’ aspect). This is exacerbated by their sense of 
alienation from society, which leads to bitterness and anger, and further shortens their 
fuse. There can be no deferral, both because of the possibility of violence and equally 
because there are no institutional superstructures in place to offer deferred redress. This 
lack of superstructures creates a profound sense that one must take care of oneself and 
one’s loved ones. As important, there can be no deferral because your self-worth is based 
on the group’s perception of you: you or I might well walk away after being degraded 
because of our ‘self’ image, that is precisely because we do not have a sense of identity as 
a public, real-time negotiation. A gang member, by contrast, must respond at once, not 
least because if he loses respect in the eyes of the group he is instantly vulnerable. In 
other words, there will be immediate pressure by the rest of the group to lower his status 
still further. And so, if a gang member loses an encounter, he may feel compelled to seek 
revenge to restore his honor. He thus faces a double bind: high status invites challenges; 
low status is worse, however, as it invites spite. 
 Gang members learn the rudiments of the code already on the elementary school 
playground: as children they form small groups that yield their primary social bonds. In 
those groups, they test themselves against the other kids in a campaign for respect. Such 
respect is a zero-sum system and disputes are a primary mechanism of establishing rank 
and structuring the group. 
 The Code of the Street is thus in a sense a more sophisticated, and more lethal, 
version of a fifth grade playground. Put differently, we are never more authentically 
human than we are in fifth grade. Aggression thus has a social meaning: that is, 
aggression defines the boys as individuals and structures the group, as one boy succumbs 
to another’s superior mental or physical powers. There is no place for humility in this 
system. Or mercy. Again, we see that the code involves self-preservation, and public 
identity is what matters: an individual sense of self-worth counts for nothing. The code is 
thus a performance of “I am strong”, “I can take care of myself”, and “I love to fight so 
don’t even think about it”.  
 To return to the role of objects, wearing a pair of Air Jordans is a direct assertion 
of status. The symbology of physical objects also requires a rhetoric of scarcity, of 
material poverty. On the other hand, if, out of fear of having his sneakers taken, a gang 
member wears a pair of Keds, he invites spite, and could be assaulted for that very 
reason. He does not have the luxury of wearing Keds in a display of ‘goofy chic’ or ‘I 
don’t care’. “In acquiring valued things, therefore, a person shores up his identity—but 
since it is an identity based on having things, it is highly precarious” (88). Whereas some 
boys perform their status so well as to avoid being challenged, those unable to command 
respect this way are especially alive to the threat of being dissed. Conversely, the 
pressure on the person to have the goods required to perform his identity successfully will 
make him covet someone else’s, especially if that someone is perceived as weak and easy 
prey. And if he does take someone else’s stuff “seemingly ordinary objects can become 
trophies imbued with symbolic value that far exceeds their monetary worth” (88). The 
trophy can also be wholly intangible, a person’s honor, stolen by dissing him, for 
example. Women are among the most important objects that can be acquired or lost. In 
Islands in the Street, Sánchez-Jankowski argues that disputes over the possession of 
women are a significant source of tension within gangs: “There is no area,” he declares, 
“more sensitive and none that can do more to destroy the unity of the gang” (79). Finally, 
a way of gaining respect from the group is to display nerve by performing an action that 
puts your life at risk. True nerve is thus a public display of a lack of fear of dying: being 
prepared to die garners respect, and death is preferable to losing it. Those who behave in 
this manner “often lead an existential life that may acquire meaning when they are faced 
with the possibility of imminent death” (Anderson, 92). 
 I hope you have already seen some immediate and significant connections 
between Anderson’s account and the Iliad. In fact, I want to claim that the code of the 
streets, the heroic code, and the rules of Homeric society are nearly identical. For 
example, we see at once that both societies are obsessed with ‘honor’. From the code of 
the streets we can infer that the Greek obsession implies feelings of insignificance, 
helplessness and poverty. More important, it leads to the further inference that this is a 
normal human response to such feelings. As an oppositional model, we can see the heroic 
code as the product of largely environmental factors, noting that we for the most part are 
well insulated from nature, while ancient man felt himself subject to vast and often 
hostile forces that he proceeded to personify and sacrifice to. As for dissing, we see that 
Akhilleus’ eloquence in insulting Agamemnon is a fundamental part of the symbolism of 
honor: in other words, it owes its importance in part to the fact that honor is a symbolic 
economy. On the other hand, Akhilleus is so quick to infer that Agamemnon will take 
Briseis because it is a cultural assumption that both of them will engage in such activity. 
For the same reason, Agamemnon wrongly infers that Akhilleus is engaged in a naked 
power grab. It is also clear why it is not important to Agamemnon whether the prophecy 
of Kalkhas is true: all that matters is that he delivers an authoritative performance that 
Agamemnon cannot refute, though he can attempt to nullify its effect by taking Briseis. 
We also see that honor is very much a zero-sum system: Agamemnon can only 
understand losing honor in terms of Akhilleus gaining it in relative and absolute terms. In 
that honor is negotiated in real time, it is difficult if not impossible for Agamemnon to 
accept the deferral of compensation that Akhilleus proposes. What is truly remarkable, 
and requires divine intervention to achieve, is that Akhilleus defers revenge for the insult 
Agamemnon inflicts. This issue is exacerbated by a lack of institutional superstructures 
that could be used to manage their conflict. Moreover, although a symbolic economy, 
honor can be concretely embodied in physical objects: Briseis is, in effect, a pair of 
sneakers, and Akhilleus and Agamemnon are engaging in blood-sport over who gets to 
wear them. Hence the insistence on calling her a ‘prize’. This again implies a rhetoric, if 
not the reality, of material scarcity. And it is a blood sport because to lose honor is not 
only to become vulnerable, it is an outcome even worse than death, since honor is the 
only thing worth living for. Above all, we are allowed to see what the stakes are for 
Agamemnon and Akhilleus. As Agamemnon sees it, his entire enterprise in being at Troy 
is at stake, while for Akhilleus, what’s at stake is the meaning of his, or even human 
existence. If, following Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, we accept that the will to power 
defines us as human, then Homer is probing a truly central nerve. In other words, the 
epics allow us to see basic drives that exist within all of us, which Homeric society 
simply attempts to regulate rather than to disguise and suppress. 
 
Part II An Excursus on the Anthropology of Homeric Society 
 Now that we’ve established its relevance, we can add to our understanding with a 
more detailed anthropology of Homeric society, which is structured through ‘agonistic 
exchange’ or ‘competitive reciprocity’:3 specifically, what I hope to add is that variations 
of the social dynamics we have observed can emerge under any egalitarian system, 
although it may be disguised by cultural sanction. Marcel Mauss teaches us that all 
exchanges are prestations integral to the social construction of individuals.4 Trade is thus 
domesticated warfare; in Freudian terms, capitalism is a sublimated version of the heroic 
code. Moreover, even ‘friendly exchange’ is disguised agonistic exchange. Egalitarian 
reciprocity thus creates hierarchy, through being outsmarted, simple errors of judgment, 
coercion and so forth. Georg Simmel calls attention to the tensions underlying all social 
exchange.5 Specifically, economic exchange always involves sacrifice and resistance, and 
value derives from this. The social risks of exchange are therefore enormous, while the 
nature of exchange invites cunning and outright deception. A gift is thus an imposition of 
identity and even, or especially, unequal exchanges influence both parties. 
 Membership in Homer’s elite society is thus a result of ‘performance’, of 
performing elite identity and having that performance accepted by others. Status is the 
result of competitive exchange: one establishes one’s rank by competing until meeting 
one’s match. To refuse to compete is to lose. Goods are properly acquired by competitive 
reciprocities, including gift exchange, marriage, and violence. Athletic competition, 
viewed as domesticated combat, is another means. Theft and trickery are also legitimate: 
the thief has proved he is the better man, provided the theft remains unavenged. Both 
warlike and peaceful exchange are designed to transform equals into unequals. No status 
can be acquired by competing with someone beneath you. Conversely, aiming too high is 
a recipe for death, or worse, humiliation. 
 There is relentless pressure on the individual to measure his abilities, and those of 
possible opponents. Such competition requires witnesses, since its function is social. In 
that the status won is given by the very peers with which one competes, the opinions that 
count are the ones most grudgingly bestowed. Risk is greatly exacerbated by the fact that 
honor is a public construct: failure is immediately known to the group. 
 The Iliad is ‘about’ rank, about who is truly ‘the best of the Akhaians’, and it 
exposes a problem at the heart of elite competition.6 Agamemnon believes he is the best 
because he rules the most people. Akhilleus believes he is the best because he is the 
greatest fighter. Nestor reveals his status as the greatest counselor by not asserting that 
this makes him the best. Agamemnon then uses his standing within the political system to 
deprive Akhilleus of status won as a fighter. Akhilleus thus believes he is owed 
compensation that will acknowledge his true worth. Agamemnon believes he cannot 
jeopardize his social standing by giving Akhilleus what he wants. 
 
Part III: The Psychology of the Homeric Warrior 
 So much for the sociology and anthropology of Homeric society. Further light can 
be shed on the poem by looking at modern combat veterans suffering from post traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), and vice versa. A breakthrough in this regard came in 1994 with 
the publication of Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam.7 Jonathan is a doctor of clinical 
psychiatry, who has devoted much of his career to treating Vietnam vets suffering from 
the disorder. In the book, Shay argues that PTSD tends to arise from feelings of betrayal. 
This may result in shrinkage of the soldier’s social and moral horizons until it only 
includes a close friend. If the friend is killed, the soldier feels guilt and often goes 
berserk. If matters go this far, the resulting psychological damage is real and sometimes 
permanent. Superior officers, referred to endearingly as REMFs, or Rear Echelon Mother 
Fuckers, are comparable to the Homeric gods, constantly interfering on the battlefield in 
irritating and even deadly ways. Ways of preventing and mitigating PTSD include: 
honoring the enemy, properly grieving for the dead, and communalizing grief and trauma 
through narrative, such as the Iliad. In all these ways, Shay sees the ancient Greeks as 
dealing with PTSD more effectively than the post-Vietnam US. Part of this is due to what 
he finds to be the tendency of modern western religion to demonize one’s opponent, and 
another to the unfortunate fact that war was a way of life in the Greek world, which thus 
had to have effective strategies for dealing with psychological trauma as a simple matter 
of survival. That his audience consisted almost exclusively of combat veterans also 
ensured that Homer’s account was psychologically authentic. More recently, in Odysseus 
in America, Shay has argued that performance of the Odyssey served a socially 
reintegrative function for the combat veterans by communalizing their trauma. I find this 
attractive, but would stress that Odysseus ‘returns’ in so many senses that he can stand 
for a wide range of experiences. 
 Again, I hope that at this point you are way ahead of me: Agamemnon inflicts 
moral injury on Akhilleus by taking Briseis. He does so by breaking the social contract, 
as Akhilleus immediately protests, according to which soldiers follow leaders into war so 
that they can win status by risking their lives in combat. By reducing status, as measured 
by “prizes”, to the whim of the leaders, Agamemnon has left Akhilleus with no reason to 
risk his life fighting. Whereas Vietnam soldiers “withdraw” psychologically, Akhilleus 
does so physically, but both do so because the REMFs have violated the soldiers’ sense 
of “what is right”. Any soldier, Shay claims, will respond with “violent rage and social 
withdrawal” under such circumstances. His rage and withdrawal leave Akhilleus 
especially vulnerable when his closest friend, Patroklos, is killed because Akhilleus sent 
him into war but did not accompany him. Shay’s response to scholarly puzzlement over 
the closeness of their bond is that we Classicists don’t get out much—specifically we 
aren’t vets. The result of that rage is a battle in which Akhilleus so dominates the fighting 
that not a single other Greek fighter is mentioned for two full books. He is, in short, 
berserk. Yet his ability to share his grief with Priam at the end of the poem restores 
Akhilleus to humanity. 
 Shay also identifies a Homeric type-scene known as the aristeia (or lone hero 
dominates the battlefield) as the formal, narrative structure for berserking. “Type Scenes” 
are repeated scenes, such as sacrifice, that tend to follow the same general structure. The 
aristeia is used to structure all the major battle sequences in the Iliad.8 Its typical features 
include: 
 
1. A god rouses the hero to battle 
2. Brilliance of hero (arming scene) 
3. Appeal to companions 
4. Test of martial valour 
5. Initial setback by opponents (wounding) 
6. Prayer to the god 
7. Epiphany and encouragement 
8. Renewed vigor and fresh exploits 
9. Double simile 
 
To illustrate, I will not use Akhilleus’ much more complex aristeia, but the aristeia of his 
virtual surrogate, Diomedes, in Book 5. His aristeia includes the following, in which only 
element 3 is missing. To paraphrase: 
 
Element 1) Then in turn, Pallas Athene gave strength and courage to Tydeus’ son, 
Diomedes, so that he would be conspicuous among the Argives and win noble fame 
(kleos). 
 
2) She kindled weariless fire from his helmet and shield, like the star of autumn, which 
shines especially bright when it has bathed in Okeanos. 
 
4) Phegeus and Idaios separate themselves from the ranks and face Diomedes. Diomedes 
kills Phegeus. Other Greeks kill their opponents. “But as for Tydeus’ son, you would not 
know which side he was on, whether he consorted with Trojans or Akhaians” (85-6). 
 
5) [Pandaros] stretched his curved bow against Tydeus’ son, and struck him on the right 
shoulder. 
 
6) Then indeed Diomedes, good at the war-cry prayed, “Hear me, child of aigis-bearing 
Zeus . . . be kind to me Athene and grant that I kill this man and that he come within 
range of my spear, the one who struck me first and then boasted over me. . . .” 
 
7&8) [Athene] stood near and addressed him: “Be of good courage, I have put paternal 
might in you chest. . . . Moreover, I have taken the mist from your eyes, which was 
formerly upon them, so that you may well recognize both god and man”. “Straightway 
Tydeus’ son went and mingled with the foremost fighters, and though eager before at 
heart to fight the Trojans, then three times the rage got hold of him”. 
 
8) Diomedes kills many Trojans, including Pandaros, and wounds Aineias. 
 
Element 8 is set up to look like the climax. When Aineias sees Diomedes mowing down 
the Trojans, he appeals to Pandaros for help. Diomedes’ charioteer, Sthenelos, sees them 
advancing, and declares: “Come let us fall back in our chariot, do not rage like this 
among the front ranks, for fear you lose your sweet life!” This is meant to be humorous, 
as it is tantamount to saying: “please don’t fight, it’s dangerous!” Diomedes replies in 
anger that of course he will fight and if he manages to kill them, then Sthenelos is to 
drive off Aineias’ horses as a war prize. In the event, Diomedes kills Pandaros, and goes 
on to wound Aineias, whose fall Homer describes with a formula that normally indicates 
the warrior dies.9 Aphrodite then tries to whisk Aineias off the battlefield in a comic 
reprise of the rape of Helen, whereupon Diomedes wounds her. When she then ascends to 
heaven in distress the audience is prepared to believe the aristeia is over: he has, after all 
just wounded an Olympian god! But the poet then returns us to the scene of battle to find 
Diomedes still attempting to kill Aineias, even though Apollo is now protecting him. 
“Back off!” the god commands, and Diomedes does so, “a little bit”, the poet adds slyly. 
Now surely, we think, the aristeia is over, the god himself has marked the limits, one 
might even say of human striving. But no, when Ares enters the battle, Diomedes stands 
down as Athene had earlier instructed. Then Athene returns, and takes the reins as 
Diomedes’ charioteer and the two of them wound Ares. After two false closures, each 
serving to heighten the drama of the actual climax, we get that climax. There follows 
element 9, providing closure to Diomedes’ aristeia: a double simile in which Ares’ cry 
when Diomedes wounds him is likened to that of ten thousand warriors in battle, 
followed by likening his heavenly ascent to a storm cloud. 
 From a psychological perspective, Diomedes suffers a triggering event when 
Pandaros shoots him with an arrow: note that the Iliad treats archery as a sneaky and even 
cowardly mode of fighting, precisely because one can do so from a safe distance while 
catching one’s opponent unawares. Note also that Diomedes expresses outrage at both the 
attack and the presumptuous boast that follows, when Pandaros claims Diomedes will 
soon die from his wound. Among modern vets such events often involve feelings of 
betrayal: their leaders issue stupid orders, their equipment malfunctions, and the like. 
Frequently, during the height of their battle rage, soldiers suffering acute PTSD say that 
they felt invulnerable, superhuman even. This has a direct analogy in Athene’s 
appearance and its effect on Diomedes; but note that he already seems out of control 
during his initial exploits, when the poet declares that you would not have recognized 
whose side he was on. Nevertheless, the poet clearly marks Diomedes’ acquisition of new 
powers: the mist is lifted from his eyes, his battle rage increases, and he gets a special 
weapon, consisting of Athene as his charioteer. It is also important to note in this context 
that Homer seems to see this as a good thing, or at least an awesome thing. 
 I conclude by asking you to consider Homer’s technical achievement, and Shay’s 
strategic victory. First the technical achievement, which I would again argue already 
makes Homer relevant to any modern reader who appreciates such things: simply put, 
battles on the scale of those in Homer are massive, random, chaotic and all but 
impossible to describe without likewise being massive, random, chaotic and as a result 
boring. Very few stories of actual warfare are any good as a result, yet war narratives 
remain hugely attractive, in part because the existential tragedy of man, and the drama 
and psychology that accompany it, are both constant and on a scale that can be made to 
feel truly superhuman. Homer’s solution to the problem, his way to impose order on the 
chaos, was precisely the aristeia, which also makes an ideological statement, namely that 
individuals matter. What had largely eluded scholarship until Shay came along, was that 
the aristeia is also a psychological transcript, the narrative of traumatic stress and the 
psychological disorder that issues from it. When Shay first started treating Vietnam vets, 
in addition to their physical and psychological injuries, they had suffered from years of 
neglect and indifference. This was in part a tragic consequence of America’s conflicted 
views on the war itself. And that leads to another point to which Shay calls attention: 
whether you or I support a given war, we are morally obligated to support the ticker tape 
parades when the soldiers return. It is enormously important, for their well-being and the 
well-being of all of society, to help them feel they have truly returned and to give them 
the instruments to communalize their grief and trauma. In short, what Shay 
accomplished, was to tap into the enormous cultural prestige of Homeric epic to show 
that the suffering of our veterans is a universal human experience. By relocating 
Akhilleus to Vietnam, Shay helped our own vets tell their stories, and allow their voices 
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